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Using someone else’s data: problems, pragmatics and 
provisions 
Jo-Anne Kelder 
Abstract: In the current climate of requirements for ethical research, qualitative 
research data is often archived at the end of each unique research project. Yet 
qualitative data is capable of being revisited from multiple perspectives, and used to 
answer different research questions to those envisaged by the original data collector. 
Using other people’s data saves time, avoids unnecessarily burdening your research 
participants, and adds confidence in interpreting your own data. This paper is a case 
of how data from one research project was acquired and then analysed to ground the 
analysis of a separate project using Distributed Cognition (Dcog) theory and its 
associated methodology, cognitive ethnography. Theoretical considerations were the 
benefits and difficulties of using multiple sources and types of data in creating a 
theoretical account of the observed situation. Methodological issues included how to 
use (and not misuse) other people’s data and coherently integrate data collected over 
time and for different purposes. Current ethics guidelines come from a paradigm of 
control suited to experimental, quantitative research approaches. A new paradigm that 
recognises researchers’ inherent lack of control over qualitative research contexts 
needs to be developed. This research demonstrates the benefits of designing an ethics 
application to provide for data reuse and giving participants choice over the level of 
protection they require.  
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1 Distributed Cognition theory and secondary data 
In 2003 I commenced an ethnographic research project characterised by several 
external constraints (short time frame, few resources, very busy participants) that 
strongly influenced my methodological decisions. I was using an established theory, 
Distributed Cognition (Dcog) theory (HUTCHINS, 1995) in a new domain: weather 
forecasting at the Australian Bureau of Meteorology. I did not have time or resources 
to deploy the usual variety of ethnographic tools and techniques over several years in 
a particular domain, so I adapted the Dcog research process to my particular context, 
aiming to maintain the principle of using multiple data sources to create a chain of 
representations in which to ground the interpretation (HUTCHINS & KLAUSEN, 
1996). [1] 
Weather forecasting is complex cognitive work, which has collaborative aspects and 
is highly dependent on information systems to deliver, process and package weather 
data in appropriate formats. It is dynamic, socio-technical work embedded in a strong 
culture. These characteristics made it ideal for using Dcog theory (HAZLEHURST, 
2003, pers. comm., 11th Feb). HOLLAN, HUTCHINS, & KIRSH (2000) explicate a 
framework for Dcog research that integrates theory, cognitive ethnography and 
experiment. My research is the cognitive ethnography part of that framework, the data 
collection and analysis guided by Dcog theory. [2] 
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Several Dcog ethnographies had already been written on the basis of several years of 
extensive data collection.  Typically, multiple data sources are used to validate 
conclusions of Dcog analysis including video observation, interviews, participation 
(for example, HOLDER (1999) learnt to fly), field notes and organisation documents 
(HAZLEHURST, 1994; HOLDER, 1999; HUTCHINS, 1995; HUTCHINS & 
KLAUSEN, 1996). [3] 
I had eight months available for my research project. I did not have time to do a 
weather forecast training program, conduct multiple interviews, record and analyse 
video data and collect and absorb all possible organisation documents from the 
Bureau. These time and resource constraints meant I made pragmatic choices so I 
could realistically gain access to enough data to strengthen the validity of my analysis. 
[4] 
Another, clearly important factor in the data choices I had to make was the work 
situation of my potential participants. Forecast work is very busy, and there are not 
enough forecasters available to cover the 24/7 roster comfortably. Thus taking 
forecasters out of their shift to interview them was not possible, and asking them to 
give up extra time to participate in research was problematic. [5] 
It was important not to unnecessarily burden forecasters with extra work because the 
Bureau has instituted a information systems development methodology that heavily 
relies on forecaster involvement, and forecasters already participate in forecast 
process analysis research (BALLY, 2003b) as well as research conducted from a 
Knowledge Management perspective (LINGER & BURSTEIN, 2001; SHEPHERD, 
2002; STERN, 2003). More significantly, the focus of my research was the dynamic, 
situated and embodied nature of forecast work, characteristics which cannot be 
captured in an interview. [6] 
Thus I needed a good source of information from forecasters about the understanding 
of forecast work at a tacit level to ground the interpretations I might make from video 
observation. However, I did not want to burden participants who were already under 
pressure with increasing workloads and expectations. [7] 
When I read interview transcript samples in (SHEPHERD, 2002) from a Dcog 
theoretical perspective, it was clear that access to the full transcripts would provide 
the requisite information to undergird my analysis. This was a research project on 
weather forecasters from a Knowledge Management (KM) perspective. SHEPHERD 
conducted ten semi-structured interviews with senior forecasters experienced in 
different types of forecasting and his research aimed to elicit tacit knowledge 
employed by forecasters doing their work. The interview transcripts were analysed 
using thematic coding. However, the six emergent themes only weakly mapped to 
KM literature (2002) and made a limited contribution to the Bureau’s need for a clear 
understanding of the tacit elements of the forecast process. [8] 
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Figure 1: Forecast Process Diagram: informational perspective (BALLY, 2003b). 
BALLY’s (2003b) work on the forecast analysis process produced 400 diagrams from 
various perspectives: organisational, functional and informational, but they did not 
model the subjective elements of forecasting, including tacit and implicit knowledge 
brought to bear in forecast decisions. Neither did they model aspects of forecasting 
where the activity is distributed across people and artefacts. I was asked to include in 
my research an assessment of the validity of the informational perspective (Figure 1). 
This diagram was also an important source of secondary data for my analysis. The 
forecast process articulated in Figure 1 occurs over the course of each shift (between 
seven and twelve hours duration). However, the video observation demonstrated that 
this forecast process also guides the structure and format of the briefing delivered by a 
senior forecaster (SF) when handing over his shift. Handover is essentially a summary 
of the reasoning processes and salient information used to construct the previous 
shift’s forecast policy. On the basis of this my interpretation of mental schemas held 
by forecasters had to fit within its framework. [9] 
The remainder of this paper focuses on how I used SHEPHERD’s (2002) data, 
particularly the theoretical and methodological issues in relation to using Dcog theory 
as a research approach which actively seeks out secondary data as a mechanism for 
validating interpretation of the primary data. It also outlines the constraints on my 
research generated by ethical considerations and suggests two implications for ethical 
research. The constraints were grounded in my own commitment to look after 
research participants (including ones anonymous to me) and those imposed by ethics 
policies as interpreted and enforced by an ethics committee. [10] 
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2 Theoretical considerations 
My research field is (broadly) computer supported collaborative work domains. At the 
theoretical level, DCog theory views collaborative work as a system of individuals 
interacting within their natural environment. It observes cognitive behaviour and 
focuses on the way artefacts mediate human cognition.  DCog theory rejects the 
laboratory as the appropriate context for understanding and argues for studying 
cognition as it occurs in its natural setting (HUTCHINS, 1995).  There are several key 
features of Dcog. It uses a metaphor of cognition as computation and the unit of 
analysis distributes cognitive activity socially and technically across people and 
artefacts over time.  Another feature is that DCog views cognition as essentially 
cultural, and defines computation as the propagation of representational states across 
representational media over time (HUTCHINS, 1995). [11] 
From a theoretical perspective, I decided to follow the methodology and analysis set 
out by HUTCHINS & KLAUSEN  (1996) as closely as possible to create an 
interpretation of the data grounded in the ethnography of the setting. They used 
multiple sources, types and representations of data in creating their account of 
cognitive work in an aeroplane cockpit in order to explicitly establish the connections 
between the data and its interpretation using Dcog theory. [12] 
Dcog theory was the lens for viewing and recording observations in the forecast 
office, and guided the data collection. Of primary interest was data that had any 
association with cognitive activity. The Australian Bureau of Meteorology and in 
particular, the Hobart Regional Forecast Office (RFO) had many different sources and 
types of relevant information. My primary data source was the video observation of 
an entire forecast shift (6.5 hours). The setting ethnography included: the Annual 
Report (BUREAU OF METEOROLOGY, 2003), printouts of weather charts and 
forecast products, screen prints of meteorological information systems (MetIS) 
applications, field notes including sketches of the forecast office layout, BALLY’s 
(2003b) forecast process diagrams and SHEPHERD’s (2002) transcripts. I also 
emailed a questionnaire to one forecaster to check transcription of any technical 
language in the video segment selected for detailed analysis. Most of my data was 
collected with the aim of avoiding interrupting forecasters or forecast work. For 
example, printouts of weather charts were retrieved from recycle bins and pencilled 
notes by forecasters were used on them in conjunction with comments from the 
interview transcripts on how forecasters kept track of the forecast process to discuss 
aspects of artefact mediated cognition. [13] 
SHEPHERD’s interview transcripts were important in using Dcog theory to analyse 
the video data. My research was trying to articulate the tacit knowledge embedded in 
forecaster’s memories, artefacts and work practices. This knowledge is difficult and 
sometimes impossible to articulate, even by the person expert in his or her work 
(POLANYI, 1962). However where workers have been asked to articulate the tacit 
components of their work, that articulation forms a boundary for interpretation, 
grounding it in reality. [14] 
SHEPHERD’s interview transcripts guarded against an unbalanced interpretation of 
the video data. For example, in the video observation, when the outgoing senior 
forecaster (SF) returned from doing a radio broadcast to complete the handover of his 
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shift, he expressed frustration that the radio announcer had left him waiting. The 
ensuing conversation revealed this was not an isolated occurrence. However, my 
interpretation of this frustration at being kept waiting was moderated by interview 
transcripts that showed that although an interruption, radio broadcasts are viewed as a 
positive aspect of forecasting. One interview participant thought it made forecasters 
more “accountable for our forecasts” and therefore “it makes us a little more 
responsible in our approach” so that “you try and do your best to make sure that you 
can live up to your reputation.” [15] 
The interview transcripts also provided reasons for otherwise unexplained actions 
observed in the video transcript, for example scribbling notes on printouts of weather 
charts. Furthermore, because there was a range of interviewees, variations or 
consistency in motivations and rationales were evident and able to be taken into 
account. A limitation however was that I only had participant consent to use four of 
the ten interview transcripts. [16] 
Another theoretical consideration was that the interview questions were not conducted 
from a Dcog perspective. However many responses to the interview questions were 
clearly relevant. This leads to the question of how congruent the research aims of 
different projects need to be in order to responsibly reuse data. In this case, 
SHEPHERD’s research interviewed senior forecasters, asking them how they went 
about the job of creating a forecast, what role wisdom and experience played, what 
resources they used, and how they dealt with work pressures such as interruptions and 
deadlines. The aim was to articulate forecasters’ tacit knowledge and make it explicit. 
My research observed forecasters at work interacting with each other and their 
environment. The aim was to articulate how they worked from a cognitive 
perspective, and identify the distributed aspects of their thinking processes (especially 
the use of artefacts to aid thinking). Both research projects were about forecasters’ 
cognitive work and focussed on filling the Bureau of Meteorology’s knowledge gap 
between what was already articulated about the forecast process and what was not 
(see Figure 1). This congruence made using SHEPHERD’s data relatively 
straightforward. [17] 
There was an additional (unexpected) benefit of analysing SHEPHERD’s data in a 
Dcog framework. SHEPHERD’s data was collected from a different theoretical 
framework and for a different purpose. However, it could be fruitfully analysed to 
affirm and ground insights generated from data collected and analysed in a Dcog 
theoretical framework. This facility added confidence in the strength and usefulness 
of Dcog theory. This is a case where secondary data can be used to reflect on the 
applicability and validity of a theory. [18] 
3 Methodology Issues 
Qualitative research is committed to analysis of data that incorporates the context of 
data collected in its interpretation. But context is a dynamic concept for the qualitative 
researcher, and its delineation is a function of the designated research boundaries and 
locus of attention. In addition, the researcher’s understanding of the research domain 
grows organically over time. The data record increases in value as layers of 
understanding and ability to comprehend and record details of a situation under 
observation grows. This can affect the research boundaries and locus of attention (and 
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such effects are not necessarily intended or noticed). Then, as time passes, and 
circumstances change, some of that data record can become obsolete or irrelevant to 
current research questions. Also, the context in which the data was collected can be 
lost, and with it, much of its usefulness for reuse. [19] 
This has general implications for use of secondary data and had specific implications 
for my research. Context had to be considered at two levels: the context of the 
researcher who created the secondary data and the new context into which the data 
record was being applied, and which in turn potentially becomes a source of 
secondary data for subsequent research. It is important for researchers to consistently 
keep a personal diary or collection of memos to record immediate impressions, 
thoughts, things that surprise and confuse (AGAR, 1986). These elements soon 
become familiar and “disappear” from the researcher’s consciousness, and the record 
provides the context for the collection of the data that informs later analysis. [20] 
When reusing someone else’s data, it is rare to have access to this context. I had a 
copy of SHEPHERD’s (2002) raw transcripts, complete with notes and highlighted 
text. However the notes and highlights coalesced around the particular themes 
SHEPHERD was concerned with and did not add to my understanding of the context 
of his research. Of more use were conversations with SHEPHERD and the written 
discussion of his research that provided me with information on some idiosyncrasies 
of the data. For example, SHEPHERD had requested participants with a range of 
forecast experience. He meant the variation to be across forecast work: public 
weather, severe weather, marine, aviation, etc. The ambiguity resulted in all his 
interview participants being senior forecasters who had done many of those types of 
forecasting. One of the consequences for my research was that some of these 
experienced forecasters retired at the end of the year SHEPHERD did his research, 
and could not be contacted for permission to reuse their interview transcripts. The 
more advanced age of interview participants also meant they had all been trained prior 
to the use of computers to support forecast work. SHEPHERD informed me that there 
is a difference in work practices between older forecasters and those trained in a 
highly technical environment: older forecasters rely on experience and judgement 
while younger forecasters trust the technology, and this difference was something I 
had to take into account in my use of the interview transcripts (2002). [21] 
My research was conducted in two stages (familiarisation and video observation) and 
each stage involved extensive preparation to maximise opportunities for me to absorb 
and understand the work environment and activities, and thus create an ethnography 
of the research setting.  Field observation was complemented by secondary data 
sources such as SHEPHERD’s (2002) transcripts, BALLY’s (2003b) forecast process 
analysis, the Bureau’s Annual Report (BUREAU OF METEOROLOGY, 2003) and 
website (http://www.bom.gov.au ). [22] 
The research methodology was to (iteratively) create four generations of data 
representations: 1) the ‘raw’ video and audio recordings; 2) the video transcription 
and coding of verbal and other behaviour; 3) a description of the actions of 
participants related to their goals and expectations and 4) a translation of the action 
descriptions of events into interpretations of those events and then use these  
(interrelated) representations as a basis for a theoretical account of the activity using 
Dcog theory. The four representations, the theory, and ethnography of the setting 
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were woven together to generate insights into how forecasters do their work 
(HUTCHINS & KLAUSEN, 1996). [23] 
Secondary data was used in analysing each data representation to inform, confirm and 
constrain the analysis and interpretation. Public domain information, such as 
contained in the Bureau’s website (http://www.bom.gov.au/ ) and its Annual Report 
(BUREAU OF METEOROLOGY, 2003) provided general cultural information (for 
example, the titles and responsibilities of different levels of forecast work), historical 
information and an organisation-level articulation of its work. [24] 
SHEPHERD’s (2002) transcripts provided information for analysis at work practice-
level. They were very important for highlighting which observed events were fruitful 
for more detailed analysis. The interview transcripts also gave insight into the 
significance and meaning of events in focus as well as constraining the interpretation. 
For example, the video showed that dealing with interruptions was a major part of the 
handover activity. During the video observation, the outgoing senior forecaster (SF) 
had to field seven telephone calls and a make a radio broadcast in the 33 minutes 
taken for handing over the forecast shift. At the end, he apologised to the oncoming 
SF for the disjointed nature of the briefing. His colleague reminded him that the 
unusual busyness was due to one of the staff missing that morning. [25] 
SHEPHERD specifically asked his interview participants about the impact of 
interruptions on their thought processes and how forecasters dealt with it and the 
interview participants discussed phone call interruptions at length. One participant 
disclosed that normally the forecast process is supported by people whose job is to 
answer the phones, “but in the event that they are not there, it is very, very noticeable 
on the workload”. During the familiarisation stage of my research I had recorded in 
my field notes that no one is assigned to answer the phones during the morning 
handovers.  I videoed the morning shift, beginning with the handover, so I was aware 
that a missing staff member had added a radio broadcast to the handover workload, 
but that the SF having to answer telephone queries was normal. [26] 
The combination of apparently incidental information recorded in my field notes and 
the consistent comments in the interview transcripts on interruptions being a fact of 
life for forecasters, constrained my interpretation of the video transcript comments 
that might otherwise have indicated that handovers are not normally disjointed 
because of interruptions. Instead, the interview transcripts pointed to interruptions as 
an event to highlight and examine how forecasters dealt with them. [27] 
Where SHEPHERD specifically questioned forecasters on issues that could be 
directly identified in the video transcript it was relatively straightforward to integrate 
the comments of interview participants into the analysis, especially as the answers 
from the interview participants were usually congruent, with only minor variations at 
the level of detail. However care had to be taken. In the interview transcripts, 
forecasters described their strategies for recovering interrupted thoughts during the 
extended analytic process of constructing a forecast policy. Some strategies 
articulated in the interview transcripts (scribbled notes on screen printouts) were not 
observed in the video of handing over a forecast shift. Reflecting on this difference in 
the data sets led to understanding that the thought recovery strategies observed during 
handover were of a forecaster recommencing his presentation of that policy, 
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essentially a presentation of his best coherent understanding of the current weather 
situation and relevant trends, justified with reasons. The cognitive load for handing 
over a completed forecast policy is lower than the load for constructing one, as the 
judgments have already been made and just have to be remembered. [28] 
SHEPHERD’s transcripts were also important for grounding the video data analysis 
that aimed to explicate implicit cultural aspects of forecast work embedded in 
explicitly observed work practices. A behaviour stream analysis of the video 
transcript (HUTCHINS & KLAUSEN, 1996), grouped actions into functional systems 
and sub-systems to identify actions and speech that relied on cultural models (inter-
subjectively shared by participants and used as a basis of coordinating their activities). 
This provided a source of information for identifying their mental models or schemas 
(D'ANDRADE, 1995). As part of the analysis I related schemas from these data 
representations to schema made explicit in other ethnographic sources (field notes, 
Bureau documents, the interview transcripts from (SHEPHERD, 2002) and Bally’s 
(2003b) diagram). [29] 
Analysis of video data identified forecasters’ work practice of justifying each element 
of the forecast policy (verbally in handover, and mentally during the actual forecast 
process) and made visible how a culture of defensive pessimism (NORAM, 2001) is 
embedded in forecast work practices. Although details of how this culture was 
embodied in work practices had not previously been made explicit, this culture was 
already articulated among forecasters at folk level. My field notes record the tongue-
in-cheek (context!) comment by a forecaster, “forecasters view clients and the 
weather as an enemy to be vanquished … [so they] … hedge, obfuscate, and hint to 
cover themselves.” On one field visit to the Hobart Regional Forecast Centre, I 
observed pride and triumph as one forecaster reported a “Trifecta! Yes!” of accurate 
forecasting. [30] 
SHEPHERD’s (2002) interviews explored the impact of high profile weather events 
on the participants’ forecast practice.  There have been a few high profile severe 
weather events that were not forecast, such as ‘Cyclone Tracey’, ‘the Sydney hail 
storm’ and ‘the Sydney to Hobart yacht race’. These events had an acknowledged 
impact on all forecasters. One interview participant commented on particular forecast 
failure,  
 “I think it makes us a lot more conservative, a lot more conscious of the impacts of 
the weather on the user which then makes us much more conservative in our approach 
to things.  We might tend to add a little to the forecast, a little bit to the wave height, a 
little to the swell height.  I think we tend to go a little bit over the top.  I say 
conservative, or it may be that it is a little more extreme, to cover the extreme if you 
like.” [31] 
This risk-adverse culture is rooted in the knowledge that users of forecasts can lose 
life or property if not properly warned. Interview participants reported that this risk 
adversity extends to taking into account clients of the forecast: “A lot of thought goes 
into trying to tell people in a way they’ll understand the consequences of the event 
that’s occurring and in good time – time enough to allow them to take some action 
that will mitigate the effects of the event.” [32] 
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Thus SHEPHERD’s (2002) transcripts were an important source of information on 
the reasoning underlying this culture, and evidence that some of the work practices 
identified by the analysis of the video data were validly interpreted as culturally 
constituted. [33] 
For this research, I created four generations of data representations (raw data, coded 
transcriptions, action descriptions and interpretations). Each representation 
highlighted different sorts of information about the setting and each was carefully 
grounded in independent ethnography, drawn from the setting and secondary data 
sources. Combined, they formed the foundation of a theoretical account of the 
forecast process, particularly applied to the handover activity. [34] 
I constructed a Dcog theoretical account of the handover (which because of the 
linkages also accounted for many aspects of the weather forecast process) by weaving 
together the four representations, setting ethnography and the theory. I then used this 
account to generate insights into the domain of weather forecasting. Interview 
transcripts from a different research project (SHEPHERD, 2002) were profitably used 
to inform and constrain interpretations based on my primary data source (video 
observation), giving confidence in the validity of my conclusions. [35] 
4 Ethical Considerations 
Ethics is about creating boundaries for the nature and extent of information 
permissible for a researcher to acquire and limiting the use made of that information. 
There are limitations created by ethics that are grounded in the researcher’s own 
commitment to look after research participants (including ones you are not allowed to 
meet), and limitations imposed on the researcher by formal institutions such as ethics 
policies and ethics committees. The main requirement is participant consent and the 
criterion is whether that consent is free and informed. One interesting aspect of this 
criterion that was highlighted by my quest to be allowed to reuse someone else’s data 
is that someone other than the participant is invested with the power to determine 
whether their consent has been appropriately obtained. [36] 
With this in mind, the familiarisation stage of my research was very important 
methodologically but problematic ethically because I was exposed to data (primary 
and secondary) at a stage of research with ambiguous ethical status. I prepared for it 
by gaining permission from relevant people to do the project, clearly explaining its 
purpose and the benefits to the participants that I hoped to come out of my research. I 
also sent an explanatory email to the Director of the Hobart Regional Forecast Centre 
(RFC) outlining my proposed activities and the rationale. He passed this on to all 
forecasters at that office. I was guest speaker at the senior forecasters’ regular meeting 
and personally presented my preliminary research plan and fielded any questions. 
Thus, by the time I was ready to familiarise myself with the research environment my 
presence was in principle both expected and accepted. My first two visits involved 
wandering around or sitting and talking with whoever was available and had time and 
willingness to show me what they were doing. [37] 
This leads to the pragmatics and problems of ethical considerations in qualitative 
social research, the major one I faced being the order of, “which comes first? The 
chicken or the egg?” In order to submit a substantive ethics proposal that accurately 
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reflected the situation in which I was going to do research, I needed to visit and 
familiarise myself with the context. But once part of that context, especially as a 
visitor who will be coming back to do more later, the participants start interacting 
with the researcher (at least mine did). [38] 
Each time I visited, a forecaster on duty invited me to sit down with him and spent 
some of his slack time (up to 20 minutes) showing me the different software 
applications he used, telling me which ones he liked and why, work practice 
variations among forecasters and various issues and problems they had with their 
work situation. Each time I was faced with a very awkward choice of accepting the 
offer to engage in an interaction or being impolite: “No, I can’t talk to you now, I 
have to protect you and give you an information sheet (which I can’t write yet 
because I don’t know enough about your work to write something sensible) and you 
haven’t signed a consent form.” [39] 
I am very concerned to protect my participants, but as a female researcher dealing 
primarily with professional males often a decade older than me, I was conscious of 
implicit social relations that I thought were important to maintain. These forecasters 
did not want or ask my protection and to enforce it smacked of disrespect. In addition, 
politeness dictates grateful acceptance of a person’s offer of help, and allowing the 
giver to determine the timing, nature and extent of that help. Unethical politeness vs. 
ethical rudeness is an issue that occurs in the context of minimal risk qualitative 
research activities that ethics policies have yet to address. [40] 
I chose to accept their offer of teaching me about their job, and trust that the context 
already had informed consent embedded in it. Having been polite, I then knew things 
that I would not have otherwise. I recorded my impressions, in part so that I would be 
able to track the progress of my understanding of forecast work and not improperly 
use information acquired without formal consent. [41] 
Yet I know these interactions became part of my understanding and had a positive 
impact on the research process and outcomes. In particular, these preliminary contacts 
gave me strong indicators of what mattered to the forecasters in their context, and a 
sense of the complicated nature of their work and that Dcog theory was a suitable lens 
for studying them. The chats and impromptu demonstrations provided me with 
essentially ephemeral data which became part of my tacit knowledge, which in turn 
made it easier for me to understand the codifiable, recorded data from the video 
observation and to prepare tools, such as a field notes sheet to facilitate more effective 
video data recording. However because most of the data I was exposed to in the 
familiarisation phase of the research was necessarily acquired prior to formal ethics 
approval, I had to be very careful with the contribution that phase made to my 
research conclusions. [42] 
It was during this stage of the research that I realised how important and beneficial 
having permission to reuse SHEPHERD’s interview transcripts would be. I was not 
intending to interview the forecasters. A major plank of my research plan was “not 
burdening the participants” and “not taking them out of the work context”. Thus I 
crafted my ethics application to allow for contacting SHEPHERD’s interview 
participants for permission to use the transcript of their interview. The consent form 
for my research gave participants’ choice of different levels of anonymity and all 
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checked the option of being identifiable in presenting the conclusions of my research 
project. Unfortunately, because I felt I was already pushing the boundaries of what an 
ethics committee might accept, I intentionally left out the provision for the reuse of 
my own data. In hindsight that perception may have been unfounded. [43] 
Given the obvious benefits of reusing all of the ten interview transcripts I was faced 
with a barrier that (from my self-interested perspective) seemed obstructive to 
research rather than protective of participants. The reason I was only allowed to use 
four of SHEPHERD’s transcripts was that six of the experienced forecasters he 
interviewed had retired or were otherwise not contactable. I would like to argue that 
the context in which they gave the interviews meant a decision “not for reuse” could 
be considered unnecessary, in the sense that it contravened the clear willingness of 
participants to spend time discussing their work practices in order to help the 
organisation where they had worked for many decades. [44]  
Also, this was a situation where no possible harm could come to anonymous interview 
participants by their data being analysed for a similar purpose using a different 
methodology. I would like to argue further that because ethnographic data is enriched 
in comparison to other data and other analytic lenses being applied, to refuse to use it 
in that sort of context is to actually waste the time of participants. The forecasters 
were already overburdened by existing work requirements. In addition the Bureau 
developed its own meteorological information systems with a user centred approach 
that required heavy forecaster involvement. The Bureau was very concerned by the 
additional load this placed on forecasters as they tried to articulate the forecast 
process and test new software applications for usability. For me to ask for forecasters 
to spend an hour each answering questions similar to those already answered the 
previous year was not possible, because so clearly unnecessary. [45] 
Additional (potentially vexatious to the researcher) difficulties included the 
requirement to keep the participants anonymous. This meant that SHEPHERD had to 
contact all the participants (an imposition on his time), send the consent forms and 
information sheets, and then notify me when they were returned. He then had to 
arrange to keep the consent forms secure (I was not allowed to know their names) 
which has the added complication of a research project with proof of consent kept in 
two separate locations. Altogether the process was complicated with potential for 
breaching ethical guidelines for anonymity at several points. My motivation to have 
access to the transcripts was the driver for working through all the steps and for 
requesting my own participants’ permission to be identifiable. [46] 
It appears a common experience that researchers must expend significant effort and 
time with no guarantee that will be given ethics approval (c.f. ROTH, 2004, 
September). The evolving nature of ethics policy and its applications was reflected in 
apparent unevenness of treatment among my fellow researchers to the extent we were 
unable to fathom why one project was accepted and another criticised. This situation 
is particularly trying when doing research under short time frames with minimal risk 
to participants, especially if your participants find being protected an imposition, so 
that it is embarrassing to force them through the protocol. [47] 
Codification of ethics does not create or ensure ethical research. If the protocol is 
irrelevant to the context, at certain points you get researchers disengaging from the 
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spirit of the ethics process and using successful ethics proposals as templates, 
regardless of unique aspects. Assurance of anonymity is standard ethical practice in 
research and initially I put that into my proposal. However, I later submitted a 
variation to allow my participants choice of being identifiable. This permission was 
very useful in presenting my research once it was completed. For example, I could use 
a video clip to demonstrate the complex socio-technical nature of the forecast work 
environment, which even the participants appreciated seeing. (Even though I had 
written consent, I emailed the participants to tell them I wanted to show the video clip 
as part of a presentation to the Hobart RFC forecasters and assure them it was not 
necessary if the thought made them uncomfortable). [48] 
It could be argued that current ethics guidelines come from a paradigm of control 
suited to experimental, quantitative research approaches. Thus ethics policies 
frequently hinder legitimate qualitative social research in unnecessary ways and create 
a context where the research participant is viewed as passive object rather than co-
participant in the research project. The laudable aim of “protection” can also be 
construed as taking power from the researcher and instead of giving it to the 
participant, giving it to the Ethics committee. [49] 
For minimal risk research where participants in qualitative social research are not 
vulnerable or passive objects of observation needing protection, a better paradigm 
should be developed which allows for control to be given to the research participants 
to be flexible in how they participate as the research progresses. This is particularly 
important because it is not possible to predict or control the trajectory of qualitative 
social research in the way a quantitative experiment in a laboratory can be controlled. 
For example, what do you do when someone walks across the field of your video 
observation, chats with your participant and then leaves before you have time to stop 
your note taking and climb down off your step ladder- not to mention give them the 
information sheet to read and ask them to sign the consent form? [50] 
However, it could also be argued that taking careful thought and planning to make an 
ethics application that is flexible enough to accommodate most contingencies is 
worthwhile. It is important to protect our participants and a good ethics committee 
will work with researchers to ensure that protection, without creating unnecessary 
barriers to conducting our work. [51] 
5 Conclusions 
My research at the Bureau validated Dcog theory in a new domain and demonstrated 
that several insights reported in the literature on collaborative computer supported 
work situations also apply to weather forecasting. The use of secondary data sources, 
including data collected and analysed by other researchers, enriched the data analysis 
and gave a substantial basis for confidence in the validity of the analysis. The fact that 
Dcog theory was a very useful lens for understanding secondary data sources 
collected using a different theoretical perspective gave substance to claims for the 
theory’s validity. Using secondary data sources also avoided unnecessarily burdening 
the participants with time-consuming interviews. [52] 
The forecasters who participated in my research were willing to be identifiable. 
Having their permission made presenting the results of video-based research much 
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easier. However I still took care to give the participants choice at the point where their 
was potential for discomfort (video data viewed by their peers in their presence). 
Forecasters who participated in SHEPHERD’s research were not given that choice, 
which complicated the process of gaining access to his data. SHEPHERD’s 
participant forecasters’ consented to spend over an hour discussing their work, 
understanding their knowledge was being sought for the benefit of future forecast 
work practice. In that case the ethics process failed to accommodate the possibility of 
implicit consent by making it impossible to use the results of that effort more than 
once without explicit permission for a specific research project. [53] 
My research aimed to provide useful insights into forecast work that would inform 
design of better meteorological information systems to support forecasters in their 
work. After my presentation to my participants and their colleagues, the forecasters 
commented that they had never thought of their work “that way” before, but they 
could see the insights were true and worth articulating. BALLY (2003a) and LINGER 
& AARONS (2004, submitted) have subsequently referred to and applied some of 
those insights to the ongoing project of designing meteorological information systems 
for the Australian Bureau of Meteorology. This is an example of a research context in 
which the reuse of secondary data sources (including the data generated by my 
research project) is of direct benefit to the participants as well as the researcher. [66] 
There are two implications for ethical research that I can envisage. The first is that the 
paradigm for ethics approval needs to change. The current paradigm seems to rest on 
the assumption that researchers have control over the research domain and therefore 
the ability to guarantee prior informed consent from every participant. This ignores 
the reality that in a social research context, it is common for unexpected people to 
participate in unpredictable ways. In addition, it is not possible to interrupt 
unexpected interactions being observed without destroying them. [67] 
Thus, the second implication is that control of the nature and degree of consent 
currently invested in the Ethics Committee should be changed to give control to the 
participants. This requires researchers to think ahead very carefully. It is not possible 
to predict all the possible uses for data that is collected. Even if it were, the consent 
form could become an unmanageable checklist. However, consent forms can embed 
choice for participants so that they can specify the level of protection they require. 
There are some research contexts were anonymity is paramount. At the Bureau, all 
my participants checked the option of willing to be identifiable. This research 
demonstrates the benefits of designing an ethics application to provide for data reuse 
and giving participants choice over the level of protection they require. It also 
demonstrates the need for ongoing discussion on the role and authority of formal 
structures such as policies mediated by Ethics Committees in authorising qualitative 
research projects. [68] 
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